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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 This appeal is before the court for rehearing in banc 
to clarify the proper standard for a jury charge in a pretext 
case alleging age discrimination.1  
 Defendant Insurance Company of North America ("INA") 
terminated plaintiff William J. Miller from his job after fifteen 
                     
1
.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission participated on 
rehearing as amicus curiae. 
  
years of employment.2  Miller alleges that he was discriminated 
against on the basis of his age in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.   
 At trial, the district judge instructed the jury that 
it could return a verdict for Miller only if he proved that age 
was "the sole cause" of INA's decision.  After the jury returned 
a verdict in INA's favor, Miller appealed, asserting that the 
district court improperly charged the jury regarding his burden 
of proof.  We hold that in ADEA cases that do not qualify for a 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989), district courts should instruct the jury that 
the plaintiff's burden is to prove that age played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
effect on the outcome of that process.  Because Miller should not 
have been required to prove that age was the sole cause of INA's  
decision, we conclude that he is entitled to a new trial. 
                     
2
.  The parties have stipulated that INA, a subsidiary of CIGNA 
Corporation, was the plaintiff's employer at all times relevant 
to this appeal. 
  
 
 I. 
 
 
 Miller was hired in 1975 as an assistant to INA's Chief 
Financial Officer.  In that position, he directed INA's 
reinsurance operations at the Newark Reinsurance Company, created 
a financial processing service center, and directed the 
production of summary financial documents.  After serving as Vice 
President and Director of INA's Special Risk Facility, Miller was 
promoted to Senior Vice President, Field Operations.  He created 
a new organization, managed a $200 million budget, and supervised 
over 8,000 employees.  At this point in his career, Miller was 
compensated at pay grade sixty-one and his superior consistently 
evaluated his performance as exceeding expectations.   
 After his promotion to Senior Vice President, Miller 
was asked to join a special team of executives called IMPACT.  
IMPACT's mission was to identify major strategic issues and 
market strategies for INA's Property and Casualty Division.  
Caleb Fowler, Chief Financial Officer of the Property and 
Casualty Division, and Richard Hoag, then Chief of Human 
Resources, indicated that they would find Miller a permanent 
position at the conclusion of the project.  When IMPACT concluded 
in late 1984, Miller was assigned to a special project on 
reinsurance collection.   
 Upon completing the special project on reinsurance 
collection, Miller was appointed to the position of Senior Vice 
President, Finance and Administration in the Underwriting 
  
Division.  In this position, Miller managed four departments, 
handled complaints from agents and regulatory agencies, prepared 
state filings and annual budgets, and managed a $70 million 
annual budget.   
 In late 1988, Miller's supervisor, Jack Morrison, 
advised Miller that he should search for another job because his 
position might be eliminated.  In March of 1989, Miller's new 
superior, Nord Bjorke, informed Miller that his position was 
eliminated and sent him to Richard Hoag to receive a special 
assignment reducing real estate costs in the Property and 
Casualty Division.   
 One year later, Hoag informed Miller that, despite his 
success in reducing real estate costs, his position as "real 
estate czar" was being terminated.  Hoag advised Miller that he 
could assist Robert O'Neil, head of the Corporate Real Estate 
Department, with special projects.  In November of 1990, Miller 
was informed that this position was being eliminated and that he 
would be terminated at the end of December.  At the time he was 
terminated, Miller was fifty-eight years old and had been 
downgraded to pay grade fifty-nine.  At no time during 1990 did 
company officials apprise Miller of five vacancies at the company 
for which he might have applied.   
 The first vacancy was for the position of Vice 
President, Filing and Regulation.  The company announced that 
Darrell DeMoss, age forty-two, had been selected.  Miller had not 
known of the position and contends that he was qualified for it 
because, as Senior Vice President, Finance and Administration, he 
  
supervised the Filing and Regulation function.  INA asserts that 
Miller was not considered because the position required legal 
analysis and Richard Franklin, the hiring manager for this 
position, decided to hire an attorney.  Miller notes, however, 
that his name was not included on the list of nonlawyer 
candidates who were considered but disqualified, and that the 
previous Vice President, Filing and Regulation, was not a lawyer.  
 The second vacancy was in the position of General 
Manager of CIGNA Reinsurance Company, United Kingdom.  Among the 
desired qualifications were "[w]ork experience with either United 
Kingdom accounting practices or reinsurance accounting practices 
and principles."  App. at 712.  Miller asserts that this position 
involved the same responsibilities he had when he supervised the 
Newark Reinsurance Company.  James Godorecci, who was in charge 
of hiring for the position, acknowledged that he wrote the job 
qualifications with Michael Durkin, age thirty-five, in mind and 
that he never considered Miller for the position.  INA contends 
that Miller lacked the desired academic credentials, work 
experience, and knowledge of United Kingdom accounting practices, 
although Miller testified that when he expressed interest in the 
position, Godorecci's superior told Miller he was "over 
qualified."  App. at 150.   
 The third vacancy was for the position of Senior Vice 
President, Finance Systems and Administration, in the Claims 
Department.  Qualifications desired for the position included: 
broad knowledge and experience in the property and casualty 
business; knowledge of financial measures and objectives; 
  
demonstrated credibility and the ability to work with other 
managers; skill in influencing managers and implementing 
strategy; and effective verbal and written skills.  Miller 
contends he satisfied these requirements because of his 
management experience.  James Engle, the hiring manager for this 
position, testified Miller was not qualified because he did not 
have a strong math and statistical background, was not familiar 
with loss control and statistical monitors, and lacked 
credibility among the actuaries.  The company asserts that Victor 
DiFelice, age thirty-eight, was better qualified for the job.   
 The fourth vacancy, for the position of Head of 
Strategy Implementation, was filled by Ronald Peters, age forty-
nine.  The company conceded that Miller was qualified for the 
job, but maintained that Peters was better qualified.  Although  
it was a temporary assignment, when his work in this position was 
completed Peters was retained by the company. 
 The fifth vacancy was for the position of Vice 
President, Property and Casualty Marketing.  Hiring manager 
Thomas Cobb appointed Cynthia Cole-Dougherty, age thirty-eight.  
Job qualifications included an ability to conduct market studies, 
market research, competitive analyses, and segmentation studies.  
INA asserts that, although Cynthia Cole-Dougherty did not have 
insurance experience, one of the primary considerations in the 
hiring decision was a desire to hire from outside both the 
company and the industry. 
 The evidence at trial also focused on the nature of 
INA's hiring and promotion decisionmaking process.  Human 
  
resource personnel testified about the company's formal placement 
process available for positions above pay grade fifty-four ("the 
54+ placement process").  A department manager using the 54+ 
placement process would receive assistance from an assigned human 
resource contact who would act as the manager's agent within the 
company, helping to locate, sort through, and evaluate potential 
candidates for the position.  Open positions above grade fifty-
four were not publicly posted and a candidate could only access 
information about these openings through direct management 
contact.  The 54+ placement process was not mandatory, however, 
and many of the managers who testified at trial explained that 
they had in fact filled their management vacancy through an 
informal process by assessing their own needs, reflecting on the 
qualifications of their staff members, and initiating contact 
with potential candidates directly.  Richard Morrissey, director 
of human resources for CIGNA's property and casualty companies, 
also testified about the company's annual organizational review 
process through which department managers assess the 
qualifications, potential, and development needs of their staff 
with an eye toward identifying and developing future high level 
managers. 
 During trial, the district judge asked counsel if 
Miller's was a "pretext" or "mixed motives" case.  This inquiry 
made reference to the distinction between employment 
discrimination cases in which the plaintiff seeks to carry his or 
her burden by showing that the employer's tendered reason for the 
  
challenged action is a pretext for discrimination3 and cases that 
qualify for a mixed motives, burden shifting instruction under 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  Miller's 
counsel advised the district court that this was a "pretext" 
case.  The district judge then "distribute[d] to counsel the 
questions [to be used] to submit the case to the jury."  App. at 
610.  After reviewing those questions, Miller's counsel stated 
that she had an objection.  Counsel asserted that plaintiff's 
burden of proof was to establish that age was "a determining 
factor," i.e., that it "made a difference" in the employer's 
decision.  App. at 612. 
 Notwithstanding this objection, the district judge 
instructed the jury as follows: 
  To recover under the pretext theory 
which the plaintiff asserts in this case, the 
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his age was the sole 
cause of defendants' failure to hire him into 
vacancies that became available and to 
terminate his position as a real estate czar 
in the last of those listings that I've put 
on the page that you have; that he was 
qualified and rejected for the positions in 
question solely because of his age. 
 
 * * * 
     
  If the defendants articulate a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his 
rejection, the plaintiff at all times retains 
the ultimate burden of persuading you that 
the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against him because of his age. 
 
                     
3
.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).  
  
  * * * 
 
  The plaintiff under the law must prove 
that the discriminatory motive was the sole 
cause of the employment action. 
 
  In order to prove pretext, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's reasons were 
false and that discrimination was the real 
reason, however, if you disbelieve the 
reasons put forth by the defendants to 
justify their decision, you may but are not 
required to find intentional discrimination. 
 
 * * * 
     
  The plaintiff doesn't have to prove that 
the employer hated him . . . .  He has to 
prove that plaintiff's age was the sole 
determinative factor in the particular 
employment decision. 
 
App. at 673-77 (emphasis added).  At the conclusion of the 
charge, Miller's counsel renewed her "objection to . . . the 
verdict sheet. . . [and stated that] the question before [the 
jury was] whether age was a determinative factor according to 
[Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)]."  App. at 
683 (emphasis added).  The district court declined to alter the 
charge. 
 During its deliberations, the jury sent the following 
message to the district judge: 
  The jury requests clarification on the 
meaning of defendants' employment decisions 
in question # 2. 
 
  Is the question which we are addressing 
(regarding discrimination based solely on the 
plaintiff's age) focused on: a. Mr. Miller 
not being actively considered -- on the 
candidate slate, or b. Mr. Miller not being 
selected as the person to get the job, for 
each of the jobs "a" through "e"? 
  
 
App. at 691.  In responding to this inquiry, the district judge 
twice described the issues before the jury in terms of whether 
the relevant decision of INA had been "based solely on Mr. 
Miller's age."  App. at 691-92 (emphasis added).  After two days 
of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of INA.   
 
II. 
 
 We conduct a plenary review when an appellant contends 
that the instructions to the jury, read as a whole, do not state 
the correct legal standard.4  Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 
457, 462 (3d Cir.) (citing Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 
1202 (3d Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993).  "[W]e 
will reverse if the instructions were capable of confusing and 
thereby misleading the jury."  Id. (citing Limbach Co. v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1991) (in banc)).5 
 
                     
4
.  The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 626(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5
.  INA argues that Miller failed to preserve his objection to 
the jury charge.  We disagree.  Miller's counsel objected, both 
before and after the district court charged the jury, that 
plaintiff's burden on the issue of causation was to show that age 
was a determinative factor, and not the sole cause of the 
employment decision.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; Dunn v. Hovic, 1 
F.3d 1371, 1379 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) (holding that the 
purpose of Rule 51 is served when objections to the jury charge 
give the trial judge an opportunity to correct the erroneous 
charge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). 
  
III. 
 
 Like Title VII which prohibits an employer from taking 
adverse employment actions against an employee "because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the ADEA prohibits an employer from 
taking adverse employment actions against an employee "because of 
such individual's age."  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  Not 
surprisingly, the ADEA jurisprudence concerning this prohibition 
has followed the Title VII jurisprudence interpreting the 
analogous prohibition.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 
469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 
428, 432 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).  A district judge in a case under 
either statute must, of course, instruct the jury in a manner 
consistent with Congress' mandate that the adverse employment 
action must have been taken "because of" the prohibited 
consideration. 
 The nature of the causal connection mandated by the use 
of the phrase "because of" in Title VII was a focus of the 
Supreme Court's opinions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989).  The members of the Court differed as to whether 
"because of" meant that the forbidden consideration must be a 
"but-for" cause (i.e., one without which the adverse employment 
action would not have been taken) or only that the impermissible 
consideration must have "played a motivating part" in the 
decision to take that action.  See id. at 244 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
  
judgment).  All members of the Court agreed, however, that 
"because of" did not mean "solely because of."  See, e.g., id. at 
241 (plurality opinion); id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, took the position that "because 
of" required only a finding that gender or some other prohibited 
consideration played a part in the decision to take the 
challenged action.  He explained their position in part as 
follows: 
 We take these words to mean that gender must 
be irrelevant to employment decisions.  To 
construe the words "because of" as colloquial 
shorthand for "but-for causation," as does 
Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them. 
 
 * * *  
 
 The critical inquiry . . . is whether gender 
was a factor in the employment decision at 
the moment it was made.  Moreover, since we 
know that the words "because of" do not mean 
"solely because of,"7 we also know that Title 
VII meant to condemn even those decisions 
based on a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations.  When, 
therefore, an employer considers both gender 
and legitimate factors at the time of making 
a decision, that decision was "because of" 
sex and the other, legitimate considerations 
-- even if we may say later, in the context 
of litigation, that the decision would have 
been the same if gender had not been taken 
into account. 
 
              
 
  7Congress specifically rejected an 
amendment that would have placed 
the word "solely" in front of the 
words "because of."  110 Cong. Rec. 
2728, 13837 (1964). 
  
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41 (emphasis added and altered 
from original) (footnote omitted). 
 Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent for himself, the 
Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia, concluded that "because of" 
required "but-for" cause.  In doing so, he likewise rejected the 
suggestion that it was intended to mean "solely because of": 
  By any normal understanding, the phrase 
"because of" conveys the idea that the motive 
in question made a difference to the outcome.  
We use the words this way in everyday speech.  
And assuming, as the plurality does, that we 
ought to consider the interpretive memorandum 
prepared by the statute's drafters, we find 
that this is what the words meant to them as 
well.  "To discriminate is to make a 
distinction, to make a difference in 
treatment or favor."  110 Cong. Rec. 7213 
(1964).  Congress could not have chosen a 
clearer way to indicate that proof of 
liability under Title VII requires a showing 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin caused the decision at issue. 
 
  Our decisions confirm that Title VII is 
not concerned with the mere presence of 
impermissible motives; it is directed to 
employment decisions that result from those 
motives.  The verbal formulae we have used in 
our precedents are synonymous with but-for 
causation.  
 
 * * *  
 
  We are told . . . that but-for cause is 
not required, since the words "because of" do 
not mean "solely because of."  Ante, at 241.  
No one contends, however, that sex must be 
the sole cause of a decision before there is 
a Title VII violation.  This is a separate 
question from whether consideration of sex 
must be a cause of the decision.  Under the 
accepted approach to causation that I have 
discussed, sex is a cause for the employment 
decision whenever, either by itself or in 
combination with other factors, it made a 
  
difference to the decision.  Discrimination 
need not be the sole cause in order for 
liability to arise, but merely a necessary 
element of the set of factors that caused the 
decision, i.e., a but-for cause. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 281-82, 284 (additional emphasis 
added). 
 Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the result 
reached in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, disagreed with 
the plurality's reading of "because of" and agreed with that of 
the dissent: 
 The legislative history of Title VII bears 
out what its plain language suggests: a 
substantive violation of the statute only 
occurs when consideration of an illegitimate 
criterion is the "but-for" cause of an 
adverse employment action.  The legislative 
history makes it clear that Congress was 
attempting to eradicate discriminatory 
actions in the employment setting, not mere 
discriminatory thoughts. . . . Senator Case, 
whose views the plurality finds so persuasive 
elsewhere, responded: 
 
  "The man must do or fail to do 
something in regard to employment.  
There must be some specific 
external act, more than a mental 
act.  Only if he does the act 
because of the grounds stated in 
the bill would there be any legal 
consequences."  [100 Cong. Rec. 
7254 (1964).] 
 
 Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum 
that the words "because of" do not mean "but-
for" causation; manifestly they do. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63.  In the course of her 
opinion, Justice O'Connor likened the relevant principles to 
those involved in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
  
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), where the Court 
held that "the plaintiff was not required 'to prove that the 
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory 
purposes.'"  490 U.S. at 268 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Village 
of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265). 
 Finally, Justice White, who also concurred in the 
judgment of the Court, looked to Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), for guidance in 
interpreting "because of."  In the context of a public employer's 
decision not to rehire an employee in part because of his 
exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court had there "rejected 
a rule of causation that focused 'solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision 
not to rehire.'"  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259 (quoting Mt. 
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285).  Under the Mt. Healthy approach, the 
plaintiff was required to prove only that "the unlawful motive 
was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action," but 
there could be no liability if the defendant showed that it 
"'would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence 
of the protected conduct.'"  Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 
at 287).  A necessary corollary to this approach, according to 
Justice White, was that a plaintiff does not have "to prove that 
the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason 
for [the employer's] action."  Id. 
   We find it clear from the opinions in Price Waterhouse, 
and from the legislative history they cite, that Congress, by 
using the phrase "because of," did not mean "solely because of."   
  
Even if we did not have this guidance, however, we would be 
reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention that an employer 
should be liable if a hiring or discharge decision is based 
solely on an employee's age and not liable if the decision is 
based primarily on the employee's age but also on the fact that 
the employee's supervisor did not like the employee's 
personality, hair color, or some other personal trait or 
conduct.6 
 Having concluded that "because of" does not mean 
"solely because of," we now look to the governing precedents to 
determine the proper jury instruction in an employment 
discrimination case that does not qualify for a mixed motives, 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse. 
 
                     
6
.  We note that a majority of the Courts of Appeals have 
rejected the "sole cause" or "sole factor" formulation in pretext 
cases.  See, e.g., Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 
1419, 1425 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1993); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Purcell v. Seguin State 
Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1993); Montana v. 
First Fed. Savs. & Loan Assoc., 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343-44 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); Blackwell v. Sun 
Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1983); Loeb v. 
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979).  But see 
Foster v. University of Arkansas, 938 F.2d 111, 115-16 (8th Cir. 
1991) (upholding a jury instruction that required plaintiff to 
prove the protected characteristic was "the determining" and 
"sole" factor and rejecting the formulation of "a determining 
factor" as improperly eliminating the distinction between 
"pretext" and "mixed motives" cases).  We think it unclear what 
effect, if any, the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), will have on the 
standard enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. 
  
 IV. 
 The Justices concurring in the judgment in Price 
Waterhouse declined to apply to the situation before them the 
familiar rules for allocating the burdens of production and 
persuasion found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248 (1981).7  They viewed those cases as "pretext" cases 
and the case before them as a "mixed motives" case.  The Court 
held that, in cases where the plaintiff offers "direct evidence" 
of unlawful discrimination and the evidence as a whole permits a 
conclusion that both permissible and impermissible considerations 
played a role in the employer's decision, the plaintiff need only 
show that the unlawful motive was a substantial motivating factor 
in that decision.  If the finder of fact concludes that the 
plaintiff has carried this burden, the burden of persuasion 
                     
7
.  As summarized in Burdine, those rules are: 
 
 First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  Second, 
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the 
prima facie case, the burden [of production] 
shifts to the defendant to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee's rejection.  Third, should the 
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff 
must then have an opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext 
for discrimination. 
 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
  
shifts to the defendant to prove that the unlawful motive was not 
a but-for cause, i.e., that the same action would have been 
taken, because of legitimate considerations, in the absence of 
the unlawful motive.   
 The members of the Court concurring in the judgment in 
Price Waterhouse reached this result by different routes.  
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens read the 
statute as imposing liability in any situation where the unlawful 
motive was a "motivating" factor, but recognized an "affirmative 
defense" where the employer shows that the same actions would 
have been taken in the absence of the unlawful motive.  Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 250.  Justice O'Connor agreed 
with the three dissenters that the statute required but-for cause 
as a predicate to liability, but favored a burden shifting rule 
for cases in which the plaintiff "show[s] by direct evidence that 
an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the 
decision."  Id. at 276.  In such cases, the burden shifts "to the 
employer to justify its decision," -- "to show that the decision 
would have been the same absent discrimination."  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).  "[W]here a plaintiff has made this type of 
strong showing of illicit motivation, the factfinder is entitled 
to presume that the employer's discriminatory animus made a 
difference in the outcome, absent proof to the contrary from the 
employer."  Id.  Justice White found it unnecessary "to get into 
semantic discussions on whether Mt. Healthy . . . creates an 
affirmative defense."  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259.  He 
  
agreed with Justice O'Connor, however, that the plaintiff in 
Price Waterhouse had made the requisite showing that sex was a  
substantial factor in the employer's decision and that the 
"burden of persuasion then should have shifted to Price 
Waterhouse to prove" the same decision would have been made 
absent the unlawful motive.  Id. at 259-60. 
 For present purposes, there are two important things to 
note about the several opinions in Price Waterhouse.  First, a 
majority of the members of the Court did not endorse the 
plurality's view that Title VII imposed liability whenever a 
prohibited factor played a motivating role in the challenged 
decision.  Justices O'Connor and White and the three dissenters 
rejected, in the words of Justice White, "a rule of causation 
that focused solely on whether [an impermissible motive] played a 
part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision."  490 U.S. at 
259 (internal quotation omitted).  Second, while the holding of 
the Court fashioned a special rule reducing the plaintiff's 
burden of persuasion in a defined category of Title VII 
individual discrimination cases, a majority of the Court endorsed 
views of Title VII that would leave plaintiffs in other 
individual discrimination cases with the burden of showing but-
for cause. 
 All members of the Court now seem to agree that a 
showing of but-for causation by the plaintiff is required in ADEA 
cases that do not call for special treatment under Price 
Waterhouse.  In Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993), the 
plaintiff, like the plaintiff here, claimed that he had been 
  
discharged because of his age in violation of the ADEA.  The 
Supreme Court was called upon to address the relationship between 
the standard of ordinary liability under the ADEA and the 
standard of liability for liquidated damages under the provision 
of that Act authorizing such damages for "willful" violations.  
With respect to the former, Justice O'Connor, writing for a 
unanimous Court, reviewed the case law applicable to disparate 
treatment (i.e., individual discrimination) cases and concluded 
as follows: 
 Whatever the employer's decisionmaking 
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot 
succeed unless the employee's protected trait 
actually played a role in that process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome. 
Id. at 1706. 
 With respect to the standard of liability for 
liquidated damages, the Court held: 
 We therefore reaffirm that the Thurston 
definition of "willful" -- that the employer 
either knew or showed reckless disregard for 
the matter of whether its conduct was 
prohibited by the statute -- applies to all 
disparate treatment cases under the ADEA.  
Once a "willful" violation has been shown, 
the employee need not additionally . . . 
prove that age was the predominant rather 
than a determinative factor in the employment 
decision. 
Id. at 1710. 
 We find support in Hazen Paper for our earlier 
conclusion that "because of" does not mean "solely because of."  
If an ADEA plaintiff need not show that age was "the predominant 
factor" in order to establish liability for liquidated damages, 
  
surely such a plaintiff does not have to show that age was the 
sole cause of the challenged decision in order to establish a 
right to normal forms of relief.  We also believe Hazen Paper 
provides an authoritative answer to our second inquiry.  A 
plaintiff in an ADEA case who does not qualify for a burden 
shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse has the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there is a "but-for" causal connection between the 
plaintiff's age and the employer's adverse action -- i.e., that 
age "actually played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] 
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome" of that 
process.  Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.  
 
 V. 
 We find further support for our holding in the Supreme 
Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 
2742 (1993).  That decision makes clear that the trier of fact in 
a pretext case is not limited to a choice between finding that 
the alleged discriminatory motive or the employer's 
nondiscriminatory explanation was the sole cause of the 
employment action.  At the time we decided Griffiths v CIGNA 
Corp., 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 
(1993),8 it was possible to view all pretext cases as presenting 
                     
8
.  INA insists that our decision in Griffiths mandated the "sole 
cause" instructions given by the district court in this case.  
INA's reading of Griffiths would be inconsistent with a long line 
of decisions of this court, including our in banc decision in 
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.) 
(holding that an ADEA plaintiff "need not prove that age was the 
  
only two possibilities: the fact finder could conclude either 
that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the employer's 
explanation was a pretext for discrimination, or that the 
plaintiff had failed to so prove.  Under this view, if the 
plaintiff proved the employer's proffered reason was pretextual, 
the trier of fact presumed, as a matter of law, that the 
impermissible cause alleged by plaintiff was the sole cause of 
the employer's decision. 
 St. Mary's instructs that this bipolar view of pretext 
cases is inaccurate.  A finding that the employer's 
nondiscriminatory explanation is a pretext permits, but does not 
require, the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 
discriminated against the plaintiff based on the ground alleged.  
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993). 
 In St. Mary's, the plaintiff, an African-American, had 
been demoted and ultimately discharged by his employer.  He 
brought suit under Title VII, asserting that the employer's 
actions were the result of racial animus.  The employer insisted 
it took these actions because the plaintiff on a number of 
(..continued) 
employer's sole or exclusive consideration, but must prove that 
age made a difference in the decision"), cert. dismissed, 483 
U.S. 1052 (1987); see also Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the 
requirement of proving that the improper motive was "'the 
determinative factor' [to be] inconsistent with the 'but-for' 
causation test"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986).  To the 
extent language in Griffiths can be read to suggest that the 
charge in this case was appropriate, it is hereby overruled. 
 
  
 
 
  
occasions had permitted his subordinates to break institutional 
rules, and on one occasion had threatened his superior.  See 
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-48 (E.D. 
Mo. 1991).  The district court, as the trier of fact, found that 
the threatening conduct and rules violations had occurred, but 
concluded that neither these events nor the plaintiff's race was 
the real reason for plaintiff's demotion and discharge.  Rather, 
the district court concluded that "although [the] plaintiff ha[d] 
proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he [had] not 
proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally 
motivated."  Id. at 1252. 
 The court of appeals, viewing pretext cases as bipolar, 
ruled that, once the plaintiff proved the employer's proffered 
reasons were pretextual, he was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th 
Cir. 1992).  The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
trier of fact's rejection of the employer's proffered reason for 
its action did not compel the conclusion that race was the sole 
cause of the employment decision.  St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. 
Ct. at 2749-51.  Rather, the record evidence supported three 
possible causes: race, threats and violations of the employer's 
rules, and personal animosity.  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
trier of fact was entitled to draw from the record evidence 
whatever inferences that evidence would support.  Since the 
district court concluded that the explanation advanced by the 
employer was a pretext, it could have further inferred that there 
was an impermissible motive to hide.  It was not required to do 
  
so, however.  If the district court inferred that personal 
animosity was the cause of the demotion and discharge, that, too, 
was permissible. 
 We think it clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in 
St. Mary's that the trier of fact in a pretext case, where the 
record will support it, may choose not to accept either party's 
litigating position as reflecting the whole truth.  This may, as 
in St. Mary's, take the form of a conclusion that the adverse 
action was taken for a reason other than the reasons urged by the 
parties.  It may also take the form of a conclusion that the 
alleged discrimination and the employer's nondiscriminatory 
explanation both played a role in the employer's decision.  If 
the plaintiff, for example, argues that he or she was discharged 
because of age and the employer insists that it was because of 
the plaintiff's record of absenteeism, the trier of fact may 
conclude that the plaintiff's absenteeism record played a part, 
but that the plaintiff would not have been fired if he or she 
were twenty years younger. 
 In some cases, the evidence may be such that the use of 
"sole factor" or "sole cause" to describe the plaintiff's burden 
would be harmless error.  We perceive no reason, however, why a 
trial court would choose to use those phrases in any case.  Even 
in those rare cases where the evidence appears to present the 
jury with only a bipolar choice, such phrases misstate the law 
and hold a potential for creating a misunderstanding in the minds 
of the jury that may outlive their service in that particular 
case. 
  
   In most age discrimination cases that get to the jury, 
the record will support an inference that both a legitimate and 
an illegitimate reason played a role in the employer's decision 
and the charge must provide for the possibility that the jury 
will find the employer's decision to be the product of more than 
one consideration.  In those cases, the court must charge, in 
accordance with Hazen Paper, that the plaintiff's burden is to 
show that the prohibited consideration played a role in the 
decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative influence 
on the outcome of that process.9 
                     
9
.  We are here, of course, describing cases in which the 
challenged action of the employer may be the product of two or 
more motives.  It is important to understand, however, that these 
cases do not fall within the legal category of "mixed motives" 
cases reserved for special treatment under Price Waterhouse.  As 
we explained more fully in Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470, and Hook 
v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373-76 (3d Cir., May, 1994), 
"mixed motives" cases are cases not only where the record would 
support a conclusion that both legitimate and illegitimate 
factors played a role in the employer's decision, but where the 
plaintiff's evidence of discrimination is sufficiently "direct" 
to shift the burden of proof to the employer on the issue of 
whether the same decision would have been made in the absence of 
the discriminatory animus.  The term of art "mixed motive" is 
thus misleading because it describes only a small subset of all 
employment discrimination cases in which the employer may have 
had more than one motive.  Under Price Waterhouse, the correct 
wording of a causation instruction to a jury differs depending on 
whether the case before the court is a "mixed motives" or a 
"pretext" case as those categories are defined in that case.  
Only in a "mixed motives" ADEA case is the plaintiff entitled to 
an instruction that he or she need show only that the forbidden 
motive played a role, i.e., was "a motivating factor."  Even 
then, the instruction must be followed by an explanation that the 
defendant may escape liability by showing that the challenged 
action would have been taken in the absence of the forbidden 
motive.  See Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d at 472.  In all 
other ADEA disparate treatment cases, the jury should be 
instructed that the plaintiff may meet his or her burden only by 
showing that age played a role in the employer's decisionmaking 
  
 
 VI. 
 In this case, the district court's repeated reference 
to "sole cause" and "sole factor" was not harmless error.  Miller 
alleged that because of his age, he was not selected for various 
open high level management positions for which he was qualified 
and that thereafter he was terminated.  For each of the open 
positions his employer offered evidence to show that Miller was 
not qualified or that he was less qualified than the candidate 
ultimately selected.  Based on the evidence presented at trial, a 
jury could well have concluded that both Miller's and the 
employer's explanations were accurate--that Miller was qualified 
for one or more of the open positions, that the employer's 
promotion and hiring decisionmaking process contained a bias in 
favor of younger employees, and that Miller's credentials did not 
sufficiently distinguish him from the competing candidates to 
overcome this bias.   
 For example, with respect to the vacancy for general 
manager with CIGNA Reinsurance Company, United Kingdom (the 
"CIGNA UK position"), the manager responsible for filling that 
position testified that he wrote the job description with Michael 
Durkin, the successful candidate, in mind; that Durkin had most 
of the qualities needed for that position; and that Durkin had 
more experience than Miller in reinsurance and accounting work.  
(..continued) 
process and that it had a determinative effect on the outcome of 
that process. 
  
A jury who credited the employer's evidence could therefore 
conclude that Durkin's promotion was a legitimate hiring 
decision.  However, Miller testified that he had extensive 
reinsurance experience as well as substantially more management 
experience and skills than Durkin -- one of the qualifications 
for the position.  Durkin had managed a staff of only twenty 
employees, while Miller had managed much larger groups.  Miller 
also testified that when he expressed interest in the CIGNA UK 
position the president of that division told him he was 
"overqualified."  Miller also offered evidence that Durkin had 
obtained his reinsurance experience in part through his manager's 
desire to cross-train and develop him for this type of managerial 
promotion.  Miller additionally points out that many of the INA 
managers responsible for the hiring decisions at issue, including 
the manager who filled the CIGNA UK position, testified that they 
eschewed the company's formal inter-departmental placement 
process available for positions above grade fifty-four for an 
informal and personal decisionmaking process.  This testimony 
lends credence to Miller's theory that the promotion and hiring 
decisions for upper level management positions were susceptible 
to age-animus.  Accordingly, a jury crediting Miller's evidence 
could infer that the decision not to consider or select him for 
the CIGNA UK position was based on age.   
 Because INA's and Miller's explanations were not 
inherently contradictory, however, it would have been possible 
for the jury to find that the company considered both Miller's 
qualifications and his age, and that both factored into the 
  
relevant hiring decisions.  Thus, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Miller was less than ideally qualified for a 
particular position and that this was a factor in INA's 
decisionmaking process.  At the same time, it could reasonably 
have concluded that INA's decisionmakers were biased in favor of 
younger workers and a younger person with Miller's credentials 
would have been assigned to the post.   
 The ADEA's protection against age discrimination is not 
limited to perfectly qualified employees.  As the court observed 
in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990): "The 
statute does not protect merely the older worker who is perfect 
from the standpoint of his employer; such a worker needs no 
protection except from irrational employers, and they are rare.  
It protects, as a practical matter, the imperfect older worker 
from being treated worse than the imperfect younger one."  Cf. 
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("[N]either Title VII nor ADEA strips a wrongdoing 
employee of his or her entitlement to protection against unlawful 
discrimination.").  Despite his imperfect credentials, Miller 
should have prevailed if he would not have been passed over but 
for his age.  The district court's "sole cause" charge did not 
permit the jury to find in Miller's favor on this basis.  It 
follows that Miller is entitled to a new trial. 
 
 VII. 
 We hold that in an ADEA case which does not qualify for 
a burden shifting instruction under Price Waterhouse, a district 
  
court should instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that age played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
effect on the outcome of that process.10  Since the district 
court instructed that age must be shown to be the sole cause of 
the employer's decision and since the record would support a 
conclusion that, while other factors played a role, age was a 
determinative factor, we will reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 
                                 Miller v. CIGNA Corporation; The 
Insurance Company of North America, No. 93-1773 
                     
10
.  In the course of this opinion, we have relied on Title VII 
cases because the development of the relevant case law under the 
two statutes prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 followed 
parallel courses.  Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), provides that "an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that [a prohibited consideration] was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice."  The substantive provisions of the 
1991 Act that amended Title VII did not amend the ADEA, and 
Miller does not contend that section 107 is applicable to ADEA 
cases. 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
 
 To put it succinctly, the question before us is the 
effect of Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 
1701 (1993), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, ____ U.S. 
____, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993), on our holding in Griffiths v. CIGNA 
Corp., 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 
S.Ct. 186 (1993), that there are two types of cases under the 
  
ADEA -- mixed motives cases and pretext cases -- and that in the 
latter, the plaintiff must show that age was the determinative 
factor in the adverse employment decision.  The majority 
correctly concludes that "in ADEA cases that do not qualify for a 
burden shifting charge under Price Waterhouse . . . district 
courts should instruct the jury that the plaintiff's burden is to 
prove that age played a role in the employer's decisionmaking 
process and that it had a determinative effect on the outcome of 
that process."  Typescript at 3.  I thus join in the Introduction 
and Parts I, II, VI and VII of the majority Opinion.  I write 
separately for three reasons:  First, I cannot accept portions of 
the majority's analysis in Parts III, IV and V.  Second, the area 
of employment discrimination law is cursed with elusive terms 
like "mixed motives" and "pretext," and with numerous 
presumptions, inferences and burden-shifting rules.  Those terms 
and rules historically often have taken on lives of their own, 
independent of their connection to the underlying theories of 
liability that gave them birth.  Thus, a "mixed motives" case is 
not about mixed motives, and a "pretext" case has little to do 
with pretext.  I believe the time has come to clarify the current 
status of theories of ADEA liability, and to dispense with 
unhelpful monikers whenever possible.  Thus, unlike the in banc 
majority, I would dispense altogether with the terms "pretext" 
and "mixed motives" and hold explicitly that the same standard 
applies to all disparate treatment cases.  Finally, I believe 
  
that the entire debate over "but-for" causation makes something 
out of nothing, and that district courts should feel free to 
instruct juries in all ADEA cases that a plaintiff does not 
succeed unless but-for causation is shown. 
 
 I. 
 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817 (1973), the Supreme Court first set forth the order of 
proof in disparate treatment cases, and the Court elaborated upon 
and explained the framework in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981).  In the later 
case, the Court described the process as follows: 
 First, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by the preponderance of the evidence 
a prima facie case of discrimination.  
Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving 
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas], at 802, 93 
S.Ct. at 1824.  Third, should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then 
have an opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant 
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext 
for discrimination.  Id. at 804, 93 S.Ct., at 
1825. 
 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.  Burdine 
repeatedly speaks about the employer's "true" reason for the 
discharge, see id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, and therefore, the 
opinion was cast in either-or terms.  Post-Burdine cases 
  
reaffirmed this proposition.  See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. 
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 
2469, 2473 n.5 (1983) (in Burdine, "[t]he Court discussed only 
the situation in which the issue is whether either illegal or 
legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the 
decision"); United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717, 718, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1483 (1983) ("a 
plaintiff prevail[s] when at the third stage of a Title VII trial 
he demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the 
employment decision") (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Thus, the pre-
Price Waterhouse jurisprudence "assumed . . . that a single 
impulse moves the employer who discriminates," see Theodore Y. 
Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII:  
A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 47 
(1990), and that all disparate treatment claims could be analyzed 
under Burdine's either-or pretext framework.  This did not mean 
that the Court foreclosed liability when more than one cause 
motivated the adverse employment decision, but only that the 
employment discrimination cases coming before the Court were 
argued under the Burdine pretext framework. 
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 
1775 (1989), changed the employment discrimination liability 
landscape, but not in the way the in banc majority suggests.  In 
my view, the majority confuses Price Waterhouse's general holding 
  
that plaintiffs may obtain relief despite their inability to fit 
their proofs into Burdine's pretext framework, with the standard 
for causation in cases that do proceed under Burdine.  The 
majority correctly points out that "[a]ll members of the [Price 
Waterhouse] Court agreed . . . that 'because of' did not mean 
'solely because of.'"  Typescript at 12.  But the quotations from 
the Price Waterhouse opinions demonstrate only that in that case, 
all members of the Court agreed that plaintiffs were not without 
a remedy if their proofs did not fit into the classic Burdine 
mold.  Rather, all members of the Court agreed that when there is 
no one true reason behind the discharge, the employer in certain 
circumstances still could be liable.  The Price Waterhouse 
dissent suggested interpreting Burdine so that it could cover all 
claims of disparate treatment.  But a majority of the Court chose 
to retain Burdine's framework for pretext cases, and to provide a 
separate theory of liability, together with a separate order of 
proof, to apply in cases involving both legitimate and 
illegitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. 
 Thus, Price Waterhouse does not support the conclusion 
that in a pretext case, a plaintiff need not prove that age was 
the determinative factor in the employment decision.  Quite the 
contrary, a majority of the justices explicitly reaffirmed 
Burdine's assumption that in a pretext case, as opposed to a 
mixed motives case, the illicit reason must be the determinative 
cause.  Crucial passages in the various opinions, that the in 
  
banc majority does not cite, demonstrate that a majority of the 
Price Waterhouse court viewed Burdine's "one or the other" 
description of pretext liability as still viable in cases 
proceeding under a pretext theory.  Writing for himself as well 
as Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, Justice Brennan 
distinguished Burdine as follows: 
 Where a decision was the product of a mixture 
of legitimate and illegitimate motives . . . 
it simply makes no sense to ask whether the 
legitimate reason was 'the "true reason"' 
(Brief for Petitioner 20 (emphasis added)) 
for the decision -- which is the question 
asked by Burdine.  See Transportation 
Management, supra, at 400, n.5, 103 S.Ct., at 
2473, n.5.  Oblivious to this last point, the 
dissent would insist that Burdine's framework 
perform work that it was never intended to 
perform.  It would require a plaintiff who 
challenges an adverse employment decision in 
which both legitimate and illegitimate 
considerations played a part to pretend that 
the decision, in fact, stemmed from a single 
source -- for the premise of Burdine is that 
either a legitimate or an illegitimate set of 
considerations led to the challenged 
decision.  To say that Burdine's evidentiary 
scheme will not help us decide a case 
admittedly involving both kinds of 
considerations is not to cast aspersions on 
the utility of that scheme in the 
circumstances for which it was designed. 
 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247, 109 S.Ct. at 1788-89 
(plurality opinion).  Moreover, in discussing the standards for 
proving liability in a mixed motives case, the plurality pointed 
out that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that 
it is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played 
a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if 
  
she proves, following Burdine, that the employer's stated reason 
for its decision is pretextual."  Id. at 247, 109 S.Ct. at 1789 
n.12 (plurality opinion).  Justice White similarly drew this 
distinction: 
 The Court has made clear that 'mixed-motives' 
cases, such as the present one, are different 
from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas 
and Burdine.  In pretext cases, 'the issue is 
whether either illegal or legal motives, but 
not both, were the "true" motives behind the 
decision.'  NLRB v. Transportation Management 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 
2473 n.5 (1983).  In mixed-motives cases, 
however, there is no one 'true' motive behind 
the decision. 
 
Id. at 260, 109 S.Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).   
 In fact, the Price Waterhouse plurality's theory of 
employment discrimination liability necessarily assumed that a 
plaintiff proceeding under a mixed motives theory could not 
succeed under a pretext theory.  This is because of the 
following:  In a pretext case, the defendant responds to the 
plaintiff's prima facie case by offering legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge.  The plaintiff then 
must prove that those reasons are pretextual.  If a plaintiff 
cannot prove that the proffered reasons for the discharge were 
not in fact real reasons, then by definition the plaintiff has 
failed to demonstrate pretext, and has failed the third prong of 
the Burdine test.  Assume, however, that the district court is 
convinced that even though the defendant's proof has gone 
unrebutted, the plaintiff nonetheless has proven that age played 
  
a role in the adverse employment decision.  That is a scenario in 
which both legitimate and illegitimate factors played a role in 
the decision.  Here, the Price Waterhouse scenario comes into 
play, and even though the claim fails under Burdine, the 
defendant would have the burden of disproving but-for causation. 
 Thus, Price Waterhouse is important not because it said 
anything about the standard for showing pretext liability but 
because it constituted the first time the Supreme Court 
explicitly decided that Burdine liability, while alive and well, 
did not provide the only framework for imposing liability.  I 
believe, then, that the in banc majority is wrong to suggest that 
the Price Waterhouse majority used "mixed motives" as a "term of 
art" that describes "only a small subset of all employment 
discrimination in which the employer may have had more than one 
motive."  Typescript at 26 n.9.  To be sure, there is language in 
the various Price Waterhouse opinions addressing the evidence the 
plaintiff must adduce to prove that the illicit criterion played 
a role in the decision.  But, at least in Price Waterhouse, the 
nature of the evidence that can be used "to satisfy the 
factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden 
characteristic played a part in the employment decision," Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12, 109 S.Ct. at 1789 n.12, is a 
question separate and apart from how a plaintiff can proceed when 
he or she is unable to prove pretext.  In fact, in the wake of 
Price Waterhouse, a number of courts have addressed the nature of 
  
the proofs required to shift the burden in an employment 
discrimination case, and have arrived at differing results.  That 
is hardly surprising, since Price Waterhouse does not address 
that question.  Compare White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 
157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) ("To show discrimination in a mixed 
motive case . . . a plaintiff . . . may carry its burden under 
ordinary principles of proof by any sufficiently probative direct 
or indirect evidence") with Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power 
Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[w]hen a plaintiff 
presents credible direct evidence that discriminatory animus in 
part motivated or was a substantial factor in the contested 
employment action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer . . 
. .") (emphasis added).  For our part, we have held that "[a]t a 
bare minimum, a plaintiff seeking to advance a mixed motive case 
will have to adduce circumstantial evidence 'of conduct or 
statements by persons involved in the decision-making process 
that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged 
discriminatory attitude'."  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470 (quoting 
Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cas., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 
1992)). 
 In short, then, a majority of the justices in Price 
Waterhouse held that Title VII provides two theories of 
liability:  (1) pretext, or Burdine analysis, under which an 
employee only wins by showing that the employer's proffered 
reason for the adverse employment decision was pretextual and 
  
that, in fact, the decision was based solely on illegitimate 
factors; (2) mixed motives cases, in which the trier of fact 
concludes that both licit and illicit motives played a role in 
the employment decision, and where the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove that it would have made the same decision 
absent the illegitimate motive.  This means that the in banc 
majority's conclusion that "we would be reluctant to attribute to 
Congress an intention that an employer should be liable if a 
hiring or discharge decision is based solely on an employee's age 
and not liable if the decision is based primarily on the 
employee's age but also on the fact that the employee's 
supervisor did not like the employee's personality, hair color, 
or some other personal trait or conduct," Typescript at 16, 
really states the obvious.  Other than perhaps the appellant in 
Price Waterhouse, few contended or contend that a plaintiff would 
always lose under the ADEA if age was not the determinative 
factor.  The question is how to analyze claims alleging both 
legitimate and illegitimate motives. 
 
 II. 
 The in banc majority's description of Price Waterhouse 
derives not from the opinions in the Price Waterhouse majority, 
but from the Price Waterhouse dissent's characterization of the 
Court's holding.11  Justice Kennedy's dissent in Price Waterhouse 
                     
11
.  It is evident that we decided Griffiths correctly, as 
Griffiths was after Price Waterhouse but before Hazen.  Of 
  
sought to recast the Court's analytical grounding away from the 
theory underlying the plaintiff's case and in terms of the type 
of evidence the plaintiff had adduced to prove disparate 
treatment.  Writing for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy began by describing his view of the 
court's holding: 
 I read the opinions as establishing that in a 
limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, 
by presenting direct and substantial evidence 
of discriminatory animus, may shift the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant to show 
that an adverse employment decision would 
have been supported by legitimate reasons.  
The shift in the burden of persuasion occurs 
only where a plaintiff proves by direct 
evidence that an unlawful motive was a 
substantial factor actually relied upon in 
making the decision. . . . In sum, the court 
alters the evidentiary framework of McDonnell 
Douglas and Burdine for a closely defined set 
of cases. 
 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 280, 109 S.Ct. at 1806 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting).  Thus, in the dissent's view, the court did not 
draw a distinction between pretext cases and mixed motives cases 
but rather between direct evidence cases and circumstantial 
evidence cases.12  More than that, the dissent appeared to 
(..continued) 
course, Price Waterhouse constituted the first stage in a process 
that ultimately saw the Supreme Court abandoning the notion that 
there are different theories of disparate treatment liability. 
12
.  The dissent disagreed with this distinction as well:  "Our 
opinions make plain that Burdine applies to all individual 
disparate-treatment cases, whether the plaintiff offers direct 
proof that discrimination motivated the employer's actions or 
chooses the indirect method of showing that the employer's 
proffered justification is false, that is to say, a pretext.  See 
Aikens, supra, at 714 n.3, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 n.3 ('As in any 
  
criticize the plurality opinion for the latter's assumption that 
pretext analysis requires proof of sole cause: 
 The plurality tries to reconcile its approach 
with Burdine by announcing that it applies 
only to a 'pretext' case, which it defines as 
a case in which the plaintiff attempts to 
prove that the employer's proffered 
explanation is itself false. . . . This 
ignores the language of Burdine, which states 
that a plaintiff may succeed in meeting her 
ultimate burden of persuasion 'either 
directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that 
the employer's proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.'  450 U.S., at 256, 101 
S.Ct., at 1095 (emphasis added).  Under the 
first of these two alternative methods, a 
plaintiff meets her burden if she can 
'persuade the court that the employment 
decision more likely than not was motivated 
by a discriminatory reason.'  United States 
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 287-88, 109 S.Ct. at 1810.  The 
dissent's view is totally compatible with the in banc majority's 
(and my) conclusion that in all but a limited number of cases, 
the holding of Price Waterhouse is irrelevant.  See id. at 280, 
109 S.Ct. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In sum, the Court 
alters the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine 
for a closely defined set of cases.").  Indeed, I believe it is 
(..continued) 
lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or 
circumstantial evidence.')".  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 288, 
109 S.Ct. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
  
impossible to square the Price Waterhouse majority's framework 
with the language of subsequent Supreme Court cases.   
 The Price Waterhouse dissent explicitly criticized the 
Court for unnecessarily complicating disparate treatment analysis 
by dividing it into various theories.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 279, 109 S.Ct. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
("Continued adherence to the evidentiary scheme established in 
[McDonnell Douglas and Burdine] is a wiser course than creation 
of more disarray in an area of the law already difficult for the 
bench and bar.").  Just four years later, that view became the 
majority.  In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, ____ U.S. ____, 113 
S.Ct. 1701 (1993), the Court clarified the standards for proving 
disparate treatment under the ADEA.  In no uncertain terms, the 
Court held that: 
 Whatever the employer's decisionmaking 
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot 
succeed unless the employee's protected trait 
actually played a role in that process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome. 
 
Id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1706.  One thing is clear from this 
language:  In no disparate treatment case must a plaintiff prove 
that the illicit motive was the determinative factor.  It 
necessarily follows that the Court's distinction in Price 
Waterhouse between pretext cases and mixed motives cases no 
longer proves a viable rationale for the Price Waterhouse's 
burden-shifting approach.  This is because in light of Hazen, a 
plaintiff need not prove that age was the determinative factor to 
  
prove liability in a pretext case -- rather, under the language 
of Hazen, a plaintiff could succeed under Burdine without proving 
that the employer's reasons are wholly pretextual.  And, if the 
reasons are not wholly pretextual, some of them must be true.  
Further still, if some of the employer's reasons are true, 
pretext cases sometimes involve mixed motives.  Thus, after 
Hazen, the burden-shifting approach of Price Waterhouse -- if it 
survives at all -- must rest not on the distinction between cases 
involving mixed motives and cases involving pretexts for 
discrimination, but rather on the distinction between 
circumstantial evidence cases and direct evidence cases -- the 
distinction drawn by Justice Kennedy in his Price Waterhouse 
dissent.  Thus, in my view, this court should not continue to 
refer to the term "mixed motives" and then define it as meaning 
something other than mixed motives.  See Typescript at 26 n.9.  
Instead, we simply should abandon the term altogether. 
 Along with abandoning the notion of an independent 
category of "mixed motives" cases, Hazen is important for another 
reason as well -- it signalled discomfort with the Burdine scheme 
of apportioning burdens and presumptions, and consequently, with 
the entire notion of "pretext" liability.  In this regard, the 
Court foreshadowed its decision in St. Mary's by pointing out 
that "inferring age-motivation from the implausibility of the 
employer's explanation may be problematic in cases where other 
unsavory motives, such as pension interference, were present."  
  
Id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1708.  Hence, the Court expressed 
wariness about the "one or the other" approach of the pretext 
cases.  The Court supported this critique by pointing to language 
in pretext cases tending to show that liability could be imposed 
under the ADEA even when age was not a motivating factor: 
 Although some language in our prior decisions 
might be read to mean that an employer 
violates the ADEA whenever its reason for 
firing an employee is improper in any 
respect, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 
(1973) (creating proof framework applicable 
to ADEA) (employer must have 'legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason' for action against 
employee), this reading is obviously 
incorrect.  For example, it cannot be true 
that an employer who fires an older black 
worker because the worker is black thereby 
violates the ADEA.  The employee's race is an 
improper reason, but it is improper under 
Title VII, not the ADEA. 
 
Hazen, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1707.  Thus, with the 
criticism of Burdine generally, and with the Court's holding that 
in all disparate treatment cases the plaintiff need only prove 
that the illicit factor had a determinative effect on the 
outcome, the Court strongly signalled the end of pretext 
liability as a distinct theory of disparate treatment liability. 
 St. Mary's made the point even more explicit, and 
abandoned the notion of pretext liability altogether.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court rejected the view that when a plaintiff 
proves an employer's proffered reasons for the adverse employment 
action is pretextual, the plaintiff automatically wins.  Rather, 
  
in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must prove 
intentional discrimination, and the concept of affirmative proof 
is analytically distinct from proving other explanations wrong.  
St. Mary's qualified this by saying that "[t]he factfinder's 
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant 
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of 
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie 
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination."  Id. at ____, 
113 S.Ct. at 2749.  And, as the in banc majority recognizes, "[a] 
finding that the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is a 
pretext permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to 
conclude that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff 
based on the ground alleged."  Typescript at 23.  But by focusing 
on what St. Mary's says about "sole cause," the majority misses 
the real significance of St. Mary's, and may perpetuate 
misreadings of the case both in our own case law and in the 
commentary. 
 If we interpret St. Mary's purely within the pretext 
paradigm, as the in banc majority appears to do,13 the case can 
be read to say that in all disparate treatment cases proceeding 
within the Burdine framework, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, 
prove pretext.  After all, that is how Burdine described the 
                     
13
.  See typescript at 24 ("We think it clear from the Supreme 
Court's opinion in St. Mary's that the trier of fact in a pretext 
case where the record will support it, may choose not to accept 
either party's litigating position as reflecting the whole 
truth.") (emphasis added). 
  
three-pronged test.  And, we recently held in Armbruster v. 
Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 782 (3d Cir. 1994), that in a post-St. 
Mary's pretext case "a plaintiff who claims invidious 
discrimination but lacks overt evidence of discriminatory animus 
must point to evidence tending to show the defendant's 
explanation is pretextual."  (Emphasis added).  If that is true, 
however, we very nearly are back at sole cause again.  This is 
because the plaintiff is being forced not only to make an 
affirmative showing but also affirmatively to disprove facts.  
See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 783 ("After St. Mary's, it seems clear 
. . . that the trier of fact cannot find for the plaintiff merely 
because it disbelieves the defendant's proffered explanation; it 
must also be persuaded that the employment decision was the 
result of the bias that can be inferred from the falsity of the 
defendant's explanation.") (emphasis added); id. ("an ultimate 
finding of illegal discrimination in a pretext case requires 
evidence showing a prima facie case and evidence showing 
pretext") (second alteration added); see also Michael A. 
Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun:  Direct Evidence 
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 959, 964 (1994) 
("plaintiffs [must] disprove unstated reasons for the employment 
decision").  But, as Hazen makes clear, in no disparate treatment 
case must a plaintiff prove that the illicit factor was the sole 
or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.  
  
Therefore, to read St. Mary's as requiring a plaintiff to prove 
pretext is to misread the case. 
   The point of St. Mary's was not to place a dual 
burden on plaintiffs, but rather to treat disparate treatment 
discrimination cases -- after the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case and after the defendant has met its burden of 
production -- just like any other case where the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof. See also Gehring v. Case Corp., No. 94-1371, 
1994 WL 715285 at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 1994) ("Once the judge 
finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum necessary 
demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that the defendant has 
produced an age neutral explanation . . . the only remaining 
question . . . the jury need answer is whether the plaintiff is a 
victim of intentional discrimination.")  After the plaintiff and 
the defendant have met their initial burdens, the entire Burdine 
procedure no longer is of any relevance (apart from the fact that 
the procedure provided a mechanism to get evidence before the 
court).  Id.  To be sure, the plaintiff may attempt to prove 
intentional discrimination solely by focusing on the falsity of 
the defendant's explanations, see St. Mary's,     U.S. at ____ 
n.4, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 n.4, but that only means that if a jury 
disbelieves the defendant's argument, it may believe the 
opposite.  Nothing in that proposition is peculiar to age 
discrimination claims.  In other words, the plaintiff certainly 
is not required to rebut the defendant's proffered reasons 
  
completely, if he or she nonetheless is able to establish that 
the illicit motive was a but-for cause of the adverse employment 
decision.  See St. Mary's, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 
n.4 ("there must be a finding of discrimination");  id. at ____, 
113 S.Ct. at 2751 (employee must prove "that the employer has 
unlawfully discriminated"); id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2752 
("proving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often 
considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the 
real reason was intentional discrimination"); id. at ____, 113 
S.Ct. at 2753-54 ("[O]nce the defendant has responded to the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, 'the district court has before it 
all the evidence it needs to decide' not (as the dissent would 
have it) whether the defendant's response is credible, but 
'whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff.'") (citation omitted). 
 The problem probably arose with St. Mary's assumption 
that proving pretext is easier than affirmatively proving 
intentional discrimination.  St. Mary's assumed that when the 
factfinder is focussed purely on whether the defendant's 
proffered reasons are true, the plaintiff is somehow getting off 
the hook.  In some cases that may be true.  But that assumption 
certainly is incorrect as a general proposition.  Rather, it may 
be much more difficult to disprove an employer's explanation than 
to point to evidence tending to show that even if the employer's 
  
explanation is partly correct, the illicit motive also caused the 
action. 
 But putting that incorrect assumption aside, the real 
point of St. Mary's was to focus the factfinder in all disparate 
treatment cases away from the question of pretext and instead on 
the question of whether intentional discrimination took place.  
St. Mary's is important because it tells district courts to 
dispense with abstract pretext analysis altogether except insofar 
as it sheds light on whether intentional discrimination took 
place.   As in all cases, there must be evidence in the record to 
support a finding in favor of the plaintiff on the ultimate 
question.  As Hazen makes clear, when the plaintiff is not 
required to prove sole cause, it should not matter at all that a 
legitimate reason played a role in the process.  Thus, once the 
defendant has met its proffer, the jury should be instructed that 
it should consider evidence of the prima facie case, evidence of 
legitimate explanations, evidence bearing on the credibility of 
those explanations, and all other relevant evidence in the case 
to determine whether the employer discriminated against the 
plaintiff. 
 By abandoning sole cause as the basis for pretext 
liability, Hazen makes clear that there is no separate category 
of mixed motives cases.  By turning the focus in "pretext" cases 
away from evidence of pretext, St. Mary's makes clear that there 
is no separate category of pretext cases.  What we are left with 
  
is one broad category of disparate treatment cases that, except 
for the limited category of Price Waterhouse cases, should be 
treated alike.14 
 
 III. 
 This brings me to the question of causation.  The 
majority goes to great lengths to show that plaintiffs must prove 
but-for causation in order to prevail, but the ultimate test it 
announces neglects all mention of but-for causation. See 
Typescript at 25-26, Typescript at 29.  Contrary to the 
majority's intimations, all the justices in Price Waterhouse 
itself agreed on this point.  I believe that the majority is 
incorrect when it states that in Price Waterhouse, "Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens read the statute as 
imposing liability in any situation where the unlawful motive was 
a 'motivating' factor."  Typescript at 18.  While the Price 
Waterhouse plurality pointed out that "Hopkins argues that once 
she made this showing [that the unlawful motive was a motivating 
factor] she was entitled to a finding that Price Waterhouse had 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex," it quickly 
                     
14
.  In light of Hazen and St. Mary's, I agree with the 
majority's conclusion that Price Waterhouse cases are "cases not 
only where the record would support a conclusion that both 
legitimate and illegitimate factors played a role in the 
employer's decision, but where the plaintiff's evidence of 
discrimination is sufficiently 'direct'  to shift the burden of 
proof to the employer on the issue of whether the same decision 
would have been made in the absence of the discriminatory 
animus."  Typescript at 26 n.9. 
  
rejected that argument.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 n.10, 
109 S.Ct. at 1787 n.10.  Justice Brennan really was concerned 
with burdens and presumptions; his point was that if the 
defendant could not prove its affirmative defense, the trier of 
fact could presume that but-for causation had been proven.  See 
id. at 246 n.11, 109 S.Ct. at 1788 n.11 ("[W]here an employer is 
unable to prove its claim that it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of discrimination, we are entitled to 
conclude that gender did make a difference to the outcome.") 
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 249, 109 S.Ct. at 1790 ("A 
court that finds for a plaintiff under this standard has 
effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive was a 'but-for' 
cause of the employment decision.") (plurality opinion); id. at 
281, 109 S.Ct. at 1807 ("The theory of Title VII liability the 
plurality adopts . . . essentially incorporates the but-for 
standard.") (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In other words, all the 
justices always have agreed that a plaintiff cannot win in an age 
discrimination suit if but-for causation is not proved; the 
disagreement in Price Waterhouse involves the much different 
question of who bears the burden of proof and what can be 
inferred when those burdens are not met.  Id. at 281, 109 S.Ct. 
at 1807 ("The importance of today's decision is not the standard 
of causation it employs, but its shift to the defendant of the 
burden of proof.") (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
  
 The in banc majority's belief that "but-for" causation 
is surrounded in controversy has induced it to shy away from the 
concept in articulating a jury charge -- even though the majority 
opinion at one point explicitly recognizes that the Hazen test 
translates into but-for causation, see Typescript at 21 ("A 
plaintiff in an ADEA case . . . has the burden of persuading the 
trier of fact . . . that there is a 'but-for' causal connection 
between the plaintiff's age and the employer's adverse action . . 
. ."  I believe this unnecessarily complicates matters. Cf. 
Gehring, 1994 WL 715285 at * 2 ("'determining factor' is not a 
term in common usage, and it therefore does not illuminate the 
essential concepts.  Putting unusual terms in jury instructions 
does little beyond confusing the jurors").  Thus, while it is 
true that in all non-Price Waterhouse cases, the test is whether 
the "plaintiff [has proven] by a preponderance of the evidence 
that age played a role in the employer's decisionmaking process 
and that it had a determinative effect on the outcome of that 
process," Typescript at 29, the jury also may be instructed that 
this technically worded test translates into but-for causation. 
Gehring, 1994 WL 715285 at * 3 ("one attractive formulation" is 
that the jury should be instructed to decide "whether the 
employer would have fired [demoted, laid off] the employee if the 
employee had been younger than 40 and everything else had 
remained the same") (alteration in original).  In Price 
Waterhouse cases, as defined in note 10 of the in banc majority's 
  
opinion, the jury should be instructed that if the defendant 
fails to meet its burden of showing that it would have made the 
same decision in the absence of the illicit motive, it must 
conclude that the plaintiff has proven but-for causation.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
